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CORRESPONDENCE 
Legislative Inputs and Gender-Based Discrimination 
in the Burger Court 
Earl M. Maltz* 
In An Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection, 1 Michael 
Klarman poses a powerful challenge to the conventional wisdom re-
garding the structure of Burger Court jurisprudence. Most commen-
tators have concluded that during the Burger era the Court lacked a 
coherent vision of constitutional law, and was given to a "rootless" 
activism2 or a "pragmatic" approach to constitutional analysis. 3 Klar-
man argues that, at least in the area of equal protection analysis, the 
Burger Court's approach did reflect a unifying theme, which he de-
scribes as a focus on "legislative inputs."4 According to Klarman, this 
approach "directs judicial review towards purging legislative decision-
making of certain considerations rather than guarding against particu-
lar substantive outcomes."5 
Klarman is correct that the analysis of legislative inputs was an 
important element of Burger Court jurisprudence. In proffering this 
theory as a complete or near-complete explanation of that Court's 
equal protection analysis, however, he vastly oversimplifies the deci-
sionmaking dynamic of the Burger era. This point emerges clearly 
upon a close examination of the Court's gender discrimination cases 
- an area where Klarman contends that "a legislative inputs focus 
converts the morass [of decisions] ... into an orderly pattern evidenc-
ing the Justices' gradual sophistication in process theory."6 
Klarman's analysis of the gender discrimination cases relies pri-
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). B.A. 1972, Northwestern; J.D. 1975, 
Harvard. - Ed. 
1. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 
213 (1991). 
2. Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT: THE 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT w ASN'T 198, 204-05 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
3. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE AsCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER ComtT IN ACTION 
(1990). 
4. Klarman, supra note 1, at 284. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 304. 
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marily on Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 7 Califano v. Goldfarb, 8 and 
Califano v. Webster 9 - three cases dealing with gender-based discrim-
ination in the Social Security system. Taken alone, these cases might 
plausibly be viewed as supporting Klarman's position. By contrast, 
the results in other significant gender discrimination cases decided 
during the Burger era are inconsistent with a focus on legislative in-
puts. Klarman himself concedes that some of the Court's pre-Wiesen-
feld cases reflect the influence of different factors. 10 He contends, 
however, that by 1977 the Court had made a clear institutional com-
mitment to the analysis of legislative inputs that was reflected in its 
subsequent gender discrimination jurisprudence.11 
This analysis fails to take into account decisions such as Michael 
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 12 a case decided four years 
after Webster and Goldfarb. Michael M. was an equal protection chal-
lenge to a California statutory rape law that punished a male for hav-
ing even consensual sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 
eighteen, but did not provide analogous punishment for a female hav-
ing sexual intercourse with an underage male. Four Justices argued 
that this gender-based discrimination was unconstitutional, making ar-
guments consistent with legislative input analysis. 13 However, a ma-
jority of the Court rejected the equal protection claim. 
No single opinion in Michael M. commanded majority support. 
Justice Blackmun wrote a short, cryptic opinion that was devoted 
largely to an attack on the Court's decisions upholding restrictions on 
abortion funding and the access of minors to abortions. 14 The remain-
ing four members of the majority, however, joined an opinion by Jus-
tice Rehnquist that was flatly inconsistent with the premises of 
legislative input analysis. 
Rehnquist argued that the statute was justified as a device to pre-
vent teenage pregnancy, 15 and that the state was allowed to conclude 
that a gender-neutral statute would be less effective than one that pun-
7. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
8. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
9. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). 
10. Klarman, supra note l, at 306-07. 
11. Id. at 307. 
12. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
13. See 450 U.S. at 496-502 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 450 U.S. at 488-96 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
14. 450 U.S. at 481-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Blackmun also noted 
that the female in Michael M. may not have in fact consented to sexual intercourse. 450 U.S. at 
483-85. 
15. 450 U.S. at 470-71 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). 
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ished only males. 16 Those challenging the statute had argued that its 
true purpose was to protect the virtue and chastity of young women, 
and, as such, the statute was unconstitutional because it was based on 
an archaic stereotype. Rehnquist conceded that some legislators may 
have supported the statute for this reason. He also contended, how-
ever, that 
[t]he question for us ... is whether the legislation violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not whether its sup-
porters may have endorsed it for reasons no longer generally accepted. 
Even if the preservation of female chastity were one of the motives of the 
statute, and even if that motive be impermissible, petitioner's argument 
must fail because "[i]t is a familiar practice of constitutional law that this 
court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the ba-
sis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."17 
In other words, Rehnquist rejected the relevance of actual legislative 
inputs to the constitutionality of the Michael M. statute. 
Michael M. paints the picture of a Court deeply divided over the 
proper methodology to be employed in gender discrimination cases -
a picture confirmed by other cases as well. 18 Admittedly, despite dif-
fering over verbal formulations, the Burger Court was united in the 
view that discrimination against women should be subjected to strin-
gent judicial scrutiny. In the post-Reed era, only Justice Rehnquist 
was willing to countenance such discrimination. 19 By contrast, with 
respect to discrimination against men, the differences among the Jus-
tices were deep and profound. The Justices' voting patterns reflected 
the persistence of these differences. Of the fourteen cases dealing with 
such issues,2° six were decided by votes of five to four21 and five by a 
16. 450 U.S. at 473-74. 
17. 450 U.S. at 472 n.7 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)). 
18. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (no majority opinion); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (seven separate opinions). 
19. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538-43 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (juries); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (benefits for 
servicewomen). 
20. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (parental rights of unwed father); Mississippi 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (single-sex nursing school); Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (draft registration); Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 
450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) 
(workers' compensation); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (parental rights of unwed 
father); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (right of unwed father to file wrongful death 
action); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (immigra-
tion of illegitimate children); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (social security benefits); 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (social security benefits); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976) (access to 3.2% beer); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (military discharge 
based on promotion); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (property~ exemption). 
21. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 718; Michael M, 450 U.S. at 464; Caban, 441 
U.S. at 380; Parham, 441 U.S. at 347; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 199; Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 499. 
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six-to-three margin. 22 
An analysis of these decisions reveals that the Burger Court Jus-
tices fell roughly into three groups. One bloc, consisting of Justices 
Brennan, White, and Marshall, viewed discrimination against men 
with great suspicion. With the exception of Califano v. Webster, 23 and 
a single, unexplained vote by Justice Brennan in Lehr v. Robertson, 24 
during the Burger era these Justices invariably voted to strike down 
gender-based classifications. Typically, Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist opposed the Brennan/White/Marshall 
bloc. Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist has never voted to strike 
down a statute that discriminated against men; with one ambiguous 
exception, Chief Justice Burger took the same view.25 Justice Stewart 
joined these Justices except in rare cases where he found men and wo-
men to be "similarly situated" with respect to the relevant issue.26 
The balance of power on gender discrimination issues during most 
of the Burger era was held by three swing Justices -Blackmun, Pow-
ell, and Stevens. 27 A variety of considerations influenced the votes of 
this group. Stevens' analysis resembles Klarman's legislative input 
theory.28 Conversely, Powell seemed most strongly influenced by the 
the extent to which males could escape the burden imposed upon them 
by the discrimination.29 Finally, Blackmun's votes and opinions show 
22. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248; Rostker, 453 U.S. at 57; Orr, 440 U.S. at 268; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 
787; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 351. 
23. 430 U.S. at 313. 
24. 463 U.S. at 268. 
25. The one exception is Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), in which 
Burger joined a majority opinion striking down a statute providing that a widow would automat-
ically qualify for survivors' benefits under a state workers' compensation scheme, but that a 
widower would qualify only if he could show actual dependence or mental or physical incapacita-
tion on the decedent. The opinion for the Court concluded that the statute discriminated both 
against males (the widowers themselves) and females (the deceased workers). 446 U.S. at 147. 
The doctrine of stare decisis also played an unusually strong role in Wengler. See 446 U.S. at 
147-52. 
Burger's vote in Wengler is discussed in greater detail in Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of the 
Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 357, 379-80 (1982). 
26. Besides Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), discussed supra note 
25, Stewart also voted to strike down discrimination against men in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 . 
(1979) (alimony), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 214-15 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result) (access to 3.2% beer). 
27. Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart for the last two gender discrimination cases of 
the Burger era. She also proved to be a swing vote, voting to require the state to admit men to a 
previously all female nursing school in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 
(1982), but to allow states to treat unwed fathers less favorably than unwed mothers with respect 
to parental rights in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
28. Stevens' approach is outlined in Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 
464, 497 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222-23 
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). His position is discussed in greater detail in 
Maltz, supra note 25, at 387-90. 
29. Compare, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 386-87, 392, 394 (1979) (opinion of 
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no clear pattern. 30 
Given this dynamic, it is not surprising that neither Klarman's leg-
islative inputs analysis nor any other easily described theory ade-
quately explains the Burger Court's gender discrimination 
jurisprudence.31 The pattern of decisions is comprehensible only when 
one recognizes that the Burger Court was not a monolithic institution, 
but rather a collection of nine individuals who had widely divergent 
political and judicial agendas. It was almost inevitable, then, that the 
Court would produce a set of decisions that was not rootless but mul-
tirooted, reflecting the influence of a variety of different factors. As a 
result, close attention to the approaches of the Justices as individuals 
better elucidates these cases than an attempt to uncover some artificial 
structure that explains the work of the Court as a unified whole. 
Powell, J.) (striking down discrimination against unwed father) with Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 
347, 360 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (upholding denial of wrongful death 
action to unwed father who had not legitimated child). Powell's approach is discussed in greater 
detail in Maltz, supra note 25, at 390-93. 
30. For more on Blackmun's approach, see Maltz, supra note 25, at 393-95. 
31. For a somewhat different view of the factors dividing the Justices, see Ann E. Freedman, 
Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 924 (1983) (arguing 
that the Court has "oscillated between two different approaches to legislative sex classifications, 
reflecting opposing views about the nature and significance of sex differences"). 
